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ABSTRACT
In this paper we introduce and describe a novel approach to adaptive image steganography which
is combined with One-Time Pad encryption, and demonstrate the software which implements this
methodology. Testing using the state-of-the-art steganalysis software tool StegExpose concludes
the image hiding is reliably secure and undetectable using reasonably-sized message payloads
(≤25% message bits per image pixel; bpp). Payload image file format outputs from the software
include PNG, BMP, JP2, JXR, J2K, TIFF, and WEBP. A variety of file output formats is
empirically important as most steganalysis programs will only accept PNG, BMP, and possibly
JPG, as the file inputs.
Keywords: steganography, one-time pad, steganalysis, information hiding, digital forensics
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we introduce a comprehensive
steganography software system and platform
framework based on One-Time Pad (OTP)
encryption and adaptive steganography
technology. We provide usage
recommendations and advice guidelines. The
system is tested and shown to be resistant to
many common steganalysis attacks. In the
context of this paper we are assumed advocate
of the steganographer; someone who may be a
political dissident in an oppressive regime, a
religiously persecuted individual, a friendly
agent engaging in covert communication, or a
lawful individual desiring complete
communication privacy, among other
compelling examples.
BACKGROUND
Steganography
Steganography, the art of invisible
communication, is achieved by hiding secret
data inside a carrier file such as an image.
After hiding the secret data, the carrier file
should appear unsuspicious so that the very
existence of the embedded data is concealed. A
major drawback to encryption is that the
existence of the message data are not hidden.
Data that has been encrypted, although
unreadable, still exists as a suspicion-arousing
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file transfer. If given enough time, once alerted,
someone could potentially decrypt the data or
derive other intelligence regarding either
sender or receiver. A solution to this problem
is steganography; this is the ancient art of
hiding messages so that they are not
detectable.
In steganography, the possible cover carriers
are unsuspicious appearing files (images, audio,
video, text, or some other digitally
representative code) which will hold the hidden
information. A message is the information
hidden and may be plaintext, cipher text,
images, or anything that can be embedded into
a bit stream. Together the cover carrier and
the embedded message create a stego-carrier.
Hiding information may require a stego key
which is additional secret information, such as
a password or OTP key, required for
embedding the information. For example, when
a secret message is hidden within a cover
image, the resulting product is a stego-image.
A possible formula of the process may be
represented as: cover medium + embedded
message + stego key = stego-medium
The advantage of steganography is that it
can be used to secretly transmit messages
without the fact of the transmission being
discovered. Often, using encryption might
identify the sender or receiver as someone with
something to hide. It is believed that
steganography was first practiced during the
Golden Age in Greece. An ancient Greek
record describes the practice of melting wax off
wax tablets used for writing messages and then
inscribing a message in the underlying wood.
The wax was then reapplied to the wood,
giving the appearance of a new, unused tablet.
The resulting tablets could be conveniently
transported without anyone suspecting the
presence of a message beneath the wax.
LSB Steganography
The simplest and popular image
steganographic method is the least significant
bit (LSB) substitution. It embeds messages
into cover image by replacing the least
significant bits directly. The hiding capacity
can be increased by using up to 4 least
significant bits (one each for Red, Green, Blue,
and Alpha color channels, respectively) in each
pixel. It has a common weak point i.e. the
sample value changes asymmetrically. When
the LSB of cover medium sample value is equal
Figure 1. Graphical Version of a Steganographic System.
fE: steganographic function "embedding".fE-1: steganographic function "extracting".cover: cover data in which emb will be hidden.
emb: message file to be hidden.
stego: cover data with the hidden message.
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to the message bit, no change is made.
Otherwise the value 2n is changed to 2n+1 or
2n+1 is changed to 2n. There are many
improvements and modifications that have
been proposed to strengthen this technique,
such as adaptive techniques that alter payload
distribution based on image characteristics. If
the message is first encrypted and then
embedded, the security is enhanced.
2.3 One-Time Pad
The "one-time pad" encryption algorithm
was invented in the early 1900s and has since
been proven as unbreakable. The one-time pad
algorithm is derived from a previous cipher
called Vernam Cipher, named after Gilbert
Vernam. The Vernam Cipher was a cipher that
combined a message with a key read from a
paper tape or pad. The Vernam Cipher was
not unbreakable until Joseph Mauborgne
recognized that if the key was completely
random the cryptanalytic difficultly would be
equal to attempting every possible key (Kahn,
1996). Even when trying every possible key,
one would still have to review each attempt at
decipherment to see if the proper key was
used. The unbreakable aspect of the one-time
pad comes from two assumptions: the key used
is completely random and the key cannot be
used more than once. The security of the one-
time pad relies on keeping the key secret and
using each key only once.
The one-time pad is typically implemented
by using exclusive-or (XOR) addition to
combine plaintext elements with key elements.
An example of this is shown in Figure 2. The
key used for encryption is also used for
decryption. Applying the same key to the
ciphertext results in the output of the original
plaintext.
Figure 2. Example of a One-Time Pad implementation using XOR addition.
OTP is immune even to unlimited
resources brute-force attacks. Trying all keys
simply yields all possible plaintexts, all equally
likely to be the actual plaintext. Even with
known plaintext, such as part of the message
being known, bruteforce attacks cannot be
used, since an attacker is unable to gain any
information about the parts of the key needed
to decrypt the rest of the message.
METHODOLOGY
The following describes the general method
implemented in the software for key
generation, encryption, embedding, message
transfer, and decryption.
General Method
1. Random image keys are generated
using a key generator program. The key
generator program generates one-time
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pad keys that consist of random colored
pixels. Each random colored pixels
consists of random values for red,
green, and blue colors throughout the
image. One image key is generated for
every message that is intended to be
sent.
2. To encrypt a message, a cover image
and random key image is selected. Each
pixel in the cover image is XOR'ed
with the key image X, Y coordinate
pixel. Each pixel consists of a 32-bit
long integer color value. One byte each
corresponds to red, green, and blue
components, respectively. The XOR'ed
pixel values are then adjusted to hide
the message. The bytes in the message
are divided up into bits — one bit per
pixel. The least significant bit (LSB) in
the XOR'ed pixel colors are then
adjusted to hide the message. Bit
values that do not correspond are
adjusted (in general, 50% of the values
will already be set correctly). LSBs for
red, green, or blue are selected based on
a local pixel variation score, contingent
if the sum of the RGB LSBs are even
or odd (even corresponds to a 0 bit,
odd to a 1 bit).
3. At this point, the newly derived color
values are XOR'ed once again with the
random image key to generate color
values very close to the original image.
These pixel color values will be used to
construct the steganographic image
that will be sent to the receiver.
4. Ideally at this point, both the original
cover image and the senders copy of
the random image key can be destroyed
(forensically wiped from the hard drive
using a file erasure procedure). This is
to prevent later detection and
statistical comparisons.
5. Upon receipt of the steganographic
image, the receiver loads the intended
image key and XOR's each pixel of the
steganographic image with its
respective corresponding X, Y pixel in
the image key. This will derive a series
of bit values that correspond to the
plaintext message. The bits can be
reassembled into bytes (and later 2-
byte Unicode characters) that
correspond to the plaintext message.
6. The start and end of the message are
delimited by randomly chosen 10-
character delimiting strings that are
embedded as EXIF comments into the
random image key by the key generator
program. Thus, random message
padding is incorporated at the start
and end of messages.
7. The random image key also contains a
random number seed, this is used for
the random number generator
algorithm in use, and starts the
generator at the proper sequence start
value.
Random Number Generation
A cryptographically secure pseudo-random
number generator (CSPRNG) or cryptographic
pseudorandom number generator (CPRNG) is
a pseudorandom number generator (PRNG)
with properties that make it suitable for use in
cryptography. Ideally, the generation of
random numbers in CSPRNGs uses entropy
obtained from a high-quality source, which
might be a hardware random number
generator or perhaps unpredictable system
processes — though unexpected correlations
have been found in several such ostensibly
independent processes. Several robust
CPRNGs are incorporated into the
steganography software.
Mersenne Twister
The Mersenne Twister is a pseudorandom
number generator (PRNG). It is by far the
most widely used general-purpose PRNG. Its
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name derives from the fact that its period
length is chosen to be a Mersenne prime. The
Mersenne Twister was developed in 1997 by
Makoto Matsumoto and Takuji Nishimura. It
was designed specifically to rectify most of the
flaws found in older PRNGs. It was the first
PRNG to provide fast generation of high-
quality pseudorandom integers. The most
commonly used version of the Mersenne
Twister algorithm is based on the Mersenne
prime 219937−1. The standard library
implementation of this, MT19937, uses a 32-bit
word length. There is another implementation
that uses a 64-bit word length, MT19937-64,
that generates a different sequence. The
software implements a cryptographically secure
version of the Mersenne Twister provided by
the algorithm authors Matsumoto and
Nishimura.
Other Random Number
Generators
Optional random number generator selections
included in the OTP-Steg key generator
program include the following (each of these
can be optionally selected by the user):
 ISAAC — ISAAC (indirection,
shift, accumulate, add, and count)
is a cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator
and a stream cipher designed by
Robert J. Jenkins, Jr. in 1996.
 CryptGenRandom —
CryptGenRandom is a
cryptographically secure
pseudorandom number generator
function that is included in
Microsoft's Cryptographic
Application Programming Interface.
In Win32 programs, Microsoft
recommends its use anywhere
random number generation is
needed.
 RtlGenRandom — On a default
Windows XP and later install,
CryptGenRandom calls into a
function named
ADVAPI32!RtlGenRandom, which
does not require one to load all the
CryptAPI classes for usage.
 Rnd() — Standard API random
number generator (for
research/testing purposes only – it
is not cryptographically secure).
Key Generation
Key Delimiters
Upon key generation, a pair of key delimiters is
also randomly chosen of 10 Unicode characters
each for the start delimiter and end delimiter,
respectively. These are used to indicate to the
decryption program exactly where the message
starts, and where it ends. Random padding is
added to both ends of the message — the start
and the end of the message embedded in the
payload file. The key delimiters identify where
to start the message text, and where to cut it
short at the end of the message. These key
delimiters are contained in the EXIF image
comment data in the key file. No EXIF
comment data whatsoever is contained in the
payload file. Also, the key delimiter values are
utilized for random number generation seed
data used for encryption and decryption.
Expert System to Evaluate
and Score Candidate Cover
Images
It is well known from the literature that some
cover images present much better candidates
for steganographic security than others based
on image characteristics. Typically, cover
images with a high degree of pixel color
variation, very few saturated white or black
pixels, and few pixels next to each other of the
same color, are excellent payload candidates.
We implement an expert system to give the
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software user immediate knowledge of how
good a candidate a potential color image is for
detection security. We have incorporated a
tentative scoring system that evaluates images
based on several factors. The output score
ranges from 0 to 100%, with greater than 90%
score being a good candidate for a cover image.
Scores of 80-90% are marginal, and less than
80% are considered not adequate. In the
current preliminary version, a peak signal-to-
noise ratio (PSNR) versus a solid color image
is calculated. This rating is given a weighting
of 25% in the overall score. Also, the number
of same color pixels next to each other is given
a weighting of 25% for up to 5% of the image
pixels (in other words, a 5% of the image
pixels are same color next to each other, this
rating would be zero). Thirdly, a weighted
rating of 25% is given to the number of white
pixels, up to 5%. The same weighting is also
calculated for black pixels. Each of the four
factors is combined for the rating from 0% up
to 100%. Ideally, a cover image will have zero
white pixels, zero black pixels, very few colors
next to each other that are the same, and a
very high variation in color over comparison to
a solid color image.  Table 1 below lists the
above and additional cover image scoring
factors that could be evaluated in an expert
system rating scheme.
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Table 1
Potential Candidate Image Scoring Factors.
Factor Description Value
PSNR over solid color Peak signal-to-noise ratio of
image to solid color image.
Higher values are better.
Percentage of saturated colors Portion of the image that is
either all-white or all black.
Lower values are better.
Percentage of nearby same
colors
Portion of image that has
neighboring pixels of the same
color.
Lower values are better.
Randomness of LSB's Measures of randomness of the
distribution of the significant
bits.
Higher randomness is better.
Random RGB LSB
distribution
Randomness of each color
channel.
Higher values are better.
RS test on Cover Image Clean RS test on cover image. Lower values are better —
indicates less probability of a
threshold being reached after
encoding.
Chi-squared test on Cover
Image
Clean Chi-square test on cover
image.
Lower values are better.
Pure Photograph Photo has not previously been
compression encoded using
algorithm like JPEG.
Straight from a high-quality
digital camera is best.
Original Photograph No other copies of the photo
exist in clean or altered state
that can be used for
comparison.
Known source and originality
is best here.
Dimensions It is well known that
extremely large images have
less pixel color variation and
steganography here is more
easily detected.
Approximate pixel dimensions
of images frequently found on
the Internet are best — about
1600×1200 or less pixels.
Future Security =Small
Payloads
To ensure robustness against potential future
attacks we have limited payload relative sizes.
The high limit for the bits-per-pixel pixel is
approximately 25%. And since only half of
pixels are typically altered based on the
message, this corresponds to a practical limit
of about 12.5% pixel alteration. By limiting the
pixel bit payload, it quite robustly limits
detectability now and in the future. Extremely
advanced statistical detection techniques are
being promulgated that are improving the odds
of successfully detecting steganography efforts.
There is no guarantee that these steganalysis
efforts will not double or triple in effectiveness
in the next few years. As a safety measure and
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margin of security, payload size is strictly
limited by the software to an amount that
should be reasonably safe for the foreseeable
future. This equals future security for messages
that may be encrypted today and subsequently
intercepted and archived for several years for
later decipherment.
Steganalysis
Steganalysis is "the process of detecting
steganography by looking at variances between
bit patterns and statistical norms." It is the
art of discovering and revealing covert
messages. The goal of steganalysis is to
identify suspected information streams,
determine whether or not they have hidden
messages encoded into them, and, if possible,
recover the hidden information. Unlike
cryptanalysis, where it is evident that
intercepted encrypted data contains a message,
steganalysis generally starts with several
suspect information streams but uncertainty
whether any of these contain hidden message.
The steganalyst starts by reducing the set of
suspect information streams to a subset of
most likely altered information streams. This is
usually done with statistical analysis using
advanced statistics techniques.
Analyzing repetitive patterns may reveal
the identification of a steganography tool or
hidden information. To inspect these patterns
an approach is to compare the original cover
image with the stego image and note visible
differences. This is called a known-carrier
attack. By comparing numerous images, it is
possible that patterns emerge as signatures to
a steganography tool. Another visual clue to
the presence of hidden information is padding
or cropping of an image. With some
steganographic tools if an image does not fit
into a fixed size it is cropped or padded with
black spaces. There may also be a difference in
the file size between the stego-image and the
cover image. Another indicator is a large
increase or decrease in the number of unique
colors, or colors in a palette which increase
incrementally rather than randomly. These are
just examples among the many published and
effective approaches.
StegExpose is a steganalysis tool specialized
in detecting LSB (least significant bit)
steganography in lossless images such as PNG
and BMP. It has a command line interface and
is designed to analyze images in bulk while
providing reporting capabilities and
customization which is comprehensible for non
forensic experts. The StegExpose rating
algorithm is derived from an intelligent and
thoroughly tested combination of pre-existing
pixel based steganalysis methods including
Sample Pairs by Dumitrescu (2003), RS
Analysis by Fridrich (2001), Chi-Square
Attack by Westfeld (2000), and Primary Sets
by Dumitrescu (2002). In addition to detecting
the presence of steganography, StegExpose also
features the quantitative steganalysis
(determining the length of the hidden
message). We utilize StegExpose for
steganalysis to test the software reliability in
hiding messages effectively from steganalysis.
Performance Speed and
Robust Steganography
The straightforwardness of the embedding
algorithm has also resulted in the good
embedding speed. Most of the files worked
with using the software take less than 60 to 90
seconds for embedding. Typically, about 30
seconds is required for decryption. Since the
bit per pixel payload is less than 25%, the
random number generator does not have to
repeatedly struggle to find empty pixels that
have not been previously encoded.
SOFTWARE
IMPLEMENTATION
The software implementation consists of three
executable files: a key generator program, an
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encryption program, and a decryption
program. The encryption program has image
analysis functions and windows built-in to aid
in cover image categorization.
Key Generation
A screenshot of the key generation program is
shown below. The key generation program
constructs image keys of random colored pixels
according to the user preference for size and
file naming. Up to five previously discussed
random number generators can be chosen from
to generate the random colored pixels.
Figure 4. Key Generator executable program.
Encryption and Embedding
The encryption program has by wide margin
the most features and functionality built-in.
Also included are functions for deleting and
forensically-wiping the key file used for
encryption, as well as the original cover image.
By comparing the encrypted payload file to an
original cover image, steganography could
easily be detected as the difference between the
two images. It is an extremely important
security measure to eliminate the original cover
image and key as soon as possible after
encryption takes place.
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Figure 5. Encrypt/Embed executable program.
Message Hash Value
SHA-256 values of the message are calculated
in both the encryption and decryption steps. In
the encryption step, the hashed value is
incorporated into the end of the message
string. Upon decryption, the transmitted hash
value is compared to the hashed value of the
decrypted message, and displayed in the
decryption program graphical user interface. If
the values match, the user is informed that the
message has not been altered in any way since
it was encrypted by the sender. This is also a
double check that successful decryption has
taken place and the message is authentic.
Text Compression
Compression prior to embedding the message
generally reduces message size by 50 to 80%.
The zLib compression library DLL is utilized
and called as a function within both the
encrypt and decrypt programs. The result
makes encryption and decryption quicker and
also has the benefit of reducing the bit per
pixel payload size in the cover image,
increasing security against detection.
4.5 Cover and Key File
Deletion and Forensic Data
Wiping
File wiping utilities are used to delete
individual files from an operating system
mounted drive. The advantage of file wiping
utilities is that they can accomplish their task
in a relatively short amount of time as opposed
to disk cleaning utilities which take much
longer and must be run separately.
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Built-In Cover and Stego
Image Analysis Tools
Several image statistical analysis features are
built into the encryption program. Peak signal-
to-noise ratio (PSNR), RS, Chi-Squared, LSB
visual analysis, color changes, and color
variations. The distortion in the stego-image
can be measured by parameters such as mean
square error (MSE) and peak signal-to-noise
ratio (PSNR) (see Equation 1 and 2 below),
and correlation. The lesser distortion means,
the lesser MSE, but higher PSNR. If p is a
M×N grayscale image and q is its stego-image,
then the MSE and PSNR values are computed
using (1) and (2). For color images a pixel
comprises 3 or 4 bytes. Each byte can be
treated as a pixel and the same equations can
be used to calculate the MSE and PSNR.
The software image analysis window in the
encryption program is shown below. Using this
window, several operations can be performed
to estimate effectiveness of message
embedding. Least significant bit (LSB) color
values can be investigated visually. Shown on
the right of the analysis window are the least
significant bit values of the photo on the left.
If the least significant bit for red, green,
and/or blue is set, this color is added at full
intensity to the respective pixel in the image
on the right. In Figure 7, individual least
significant bit color values can be investigated
as well in the red, green, and blue channels. In
this image it is obvious there is a problem with
the blue channel — the sky has full intensity
for all values. Encoding message data here
would be risky, as the pixel variation is
nonexistent. Steganography would be very
easily detected by any encoding in this area.
As a result, the software spreads out the
message embedding adaptively, and ignores the
blue channel in the area of the sky. Since the
red channel has the most random variation
throughout the image, it carries the largest
brunt of the payload, leveraging its random
character throughout the image.
Figure 6. Image Analysis window, cover image on left, LSB analysis on the right.
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Figure 7. Analysis LSB color analysis graphics (Red, Green, Blue, All Colors).
Shown below are the variations in the red
channel, the blue channel in Figure 9 shows
the lack of variation in the sky area.
Figure 8. Red channel variation score (normalized to 0-255).
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Figure 9. Blue channel variation score (normalized to 0-255).
In Figure 10 below, the pixel least
significant bit encodings are shown. Notice
that in the area of the sky, only red pixels are
encoded in the least significant bit. Other areas
of the image vary between green and blue
embedding depending on which color has the
most variation in that pixel general area.
Figure 11 shows a blowup of the pixel least
significant coding in the area of the transition
between the trees and the sky. Notice that the
pixel encodings shift from primarily blue-green
to the red color at this transition.
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Figure 10. Pixel LSB modification encodings (Red, Green, or Blue).
Figure 11. Figure 10 "Blow-Up": Pixel LSB encodings (Red, Green, or Blue).
The decryption process largely reverses the
encryption process using the decryption
program. A SHA-256 hash value is computed
from the decrypted message and compared to
the hashed value contained within the payload
file. If the two values match, the hashed value
is presented with a green colored background.
If not, the background is reddish. A green
value indicates to the receiver that the message
has not been altered in any way since it was
written.
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Figure 12. Decrypt/Extract executable program.
USAGE
RECOMMENDATIONS
Photo selection
There are several general guidelines for photo
image selection to increase security. Original
photos taken with the user's own camera
should be selected as cover images. This is to
ensure that the duplicate of the original photo
does not exist somewhere on the Internet for
comparison. The photo should never have
previously been encoded to JPEG to ensure
full CMOS pixel sensor color variations
throughout the image. As mentioned
previously, once these criteria are satisfied, the
user can evaluate an encodability score that is
calculated by the encryption program that
ranges from 0 to 100%.
Encodability Score
The user should choose in general images that
score above 90% for encodability to enhance
steganalysis security. The following is the
weighting breakdown for the encodability
score:
25% Overall PSNR (dB) variation score (0-100%) (more color variation = higher score)
25% Same colors next to each other (0-5%) (less same colors = higher score)
25% Black pixels (0-5%) (less black = higher score)
25% White pixels (0-5%) (less white = higher score)
100% - (100-90% = OK, 90-80% = Marginal, <80% = Unacceptable)
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Recommended
Steganographic Practices
Table 2
Recommended Steganographic Practices.
No. Practice Description
1 SoftwareOperation
Steganography software should be operated on a computer that is
not connected to any network or the Internet. Files should be
transferred using write only media such as DVD or CD, or less
securely by USB drive.
2 Original Photos
Only original photos taken by the users’ high-quality camera
should be considered as cover images. This is to ensure that the
image does not have duplicates available on the Internet. Use
RAW (original camera file format) images where possible. The
software directly accepts all RAW image file types including Nikon,
Canon, Sony, etc.
3 Software USBLoaded
The software should be run off of a USB drive plugged into the
isolated computer. Further, USB drive containing software, keys,
and cover images should be located separately from the isolated
computer in a safe and secure location.
4 IsolatedComputers
The isolated computer used to run the software should be well-
secured and not networked in any way. The operating system
should be directly installed from DVD, and antivirus and checks
for malware should be regularly run to ensure there is no keystroke
loggers, rootkits, or other security compromises installed.
5 "To" and"From" Keys
Both sender and receiver should have their own set of unique keys.
Sender A to B, and B to A, each use their own one-way key series.
This is to prevent key reuse. Each key must be used only one time,
and one time only. Security using OTP depends on this precept.
6 Exchanging Keys
Key exchange should take place upon physical meeting using write
only media such as DVD or CD. Key exchange must not take place
over a network. Keys should be securely generated on isolated
computers. Keys must be stored on removable USB drives separate
from the isolated computer.
7 Deleting Files
All files including cover image files and key files should be
forensically deleted and wiped once used. Forensic wiping utilities
in the encryption and decryption programs can be used for this
purpose. Wiping consists of randomly overwriting the previous file
seven times with random data.
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No. Practice Description
8 SendingEncrypted Files
Encrypted files should be sent as anonymously as possible. Direct
email exchange should be avoided. A preferable alternative is to
upload files periodically to gallery websites which have potentially
thousands of viewers and downloaders daily. Identifying the specific
receiver will be difficult in this situation. Each sender should
upload to a different anonymous gallery.
9
Monitoring
Windows
Vulnerabilities
It should be known that just the act of plugging in a USB drive
into a Windows computer creates a digital trail throughout the
system registry. Installing software using a setup program also
creates numerous records within the operating system registry. As
a result, the software should be run off of a USB drive without
running a separate install/setup utility. Windows must be isolated
off of any network to ensure malware is not installed.
10 Malware
Malware can cause a compromise in the steganography system at
any time. A keystroke logger that is uploading typed messages is
an instant fail. Users must be extremely cautious and
knowledgeable about potential malware threats before using the
software. In particular, any networked computer presents a point of
vulnerability — the software and keys must never be used here.
Only transfer of files previously encrypted on an isolated computer
can be conducted over a network.
11 UsageLimitations
The biggest limitation is the human factor. Operational security
must be observed that all times in addition to technical security.
This means aggressive securing of the USB drive use for the
software and keys, as well as limited knowledge by parties
involved. People should be informed on a need-to-know basis only.
13 Encrypted Keys
For further security, keys can be encrypted for storage. As a result
they will not be able to be used unless the user has knowledge of
the encryption key.
14 Wipe OriginalPhotos
Original photos must be deleted and erased from the camera,
storage medium, and USB drive as soon as possible after they are
used.
15 Wipe Used Keys Keys must be deleted and erased as soon as they are used.
16
Internet
Computer
"Clean"
The computer connected to the Internet must be clean of viruses
and malware or keystroke loggers. Special care must be taken in
this area.
17 Camera Secured
The photo CMOS sensor output profile can be mapped to a
particular individual camera. Photo sent on the Internet can be
matched up to the users’ camera. As a result, an effort should be
made to keep the camera secure.
18 File UploadGalleries
File upload galleries should be selected for anonymity and high
traffic volume.
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No. Practice Description
19
Carefully
Selected Cover
Images
Cover images should be conforming to high encodability statistics
and originality. Also they should be of subject matter that will not
raise any suspicions.
20 Image FileFormat
Various image file formats can be chosen, leveraging the fact that
steganalysis software will not run on many different types of image
file types. Take advantage of other lossless file formats besides
PNG and BMP such as TIF, J2K, EXR, WEBP, and JXR.
21 Must-Dos
1: Keep software and keys in secure locations on USB drives. 2: Use
software on isolated computer not connected to Internet. 3: Use
keys and photos only once and be sure to erase files as soon as
possible, especially original cover images and keys.
Steganographic
Communication Security State
Level Estimation
We envision certain levels of steganographic
communication security levels that
correspondents can use for planning, analysis,
and security estimations. Thresholds can be
established for protective measures using these
security level guidelines.
Table 3
Notional Steganographic Security Levels.
Security
Level Name Description Impact
10 Secure
Communication commencing securely. Operational
security and human threat and insider threat must
be strongly monitored and evaluated here.
None — success
9 CommunicationSuspected
Authorities suspect communication without
knowledge of sender and receiver. Low
8 Steg StatisticallyDetected
Positive steganography screening results indicating
further investigation. Moderate
7
Internet
Computer
Searched
If proper security measures recommended previously
are followed, nothing should be derived. Duress
code-word should be immediately used and
communication ceased.
Moderate
6 TransmittedFiles Discovered
If proper procedures are used, locating these files
should not present much evidence. Moderate
5
Software
Computer
Discovered
Traces of software use should be detectable in
Windows registry. High
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Security
Level Name Description Impact
4 Steg Known Investigators conclude illicit communication hastaken place, without acquiring USB drive(s). High
3 USB Drivediscovered
User should make efforts to inform receiver
communication is compromised. Severe
2
Software
Discovered/
Acquired
Knowledge of message text should be assumed at
this point. Severe
1 Key(s) acquired Complete security compromise. Severe
0 SuspectDetained
All communicating parties should make efforts to
destroy any remaining evidence. Failure
Communicators should have a procedure in
place to indicate ceasing of messages and also
to destroy related software and keys
systematically.
Steganographers should consider
incorporating a duress code-word into their
communication security protocol. The duress
code-word should be a predetermined word or
phrase that indicates to the receiving party
that communication security has been
compromised. For example, capture by
authorities may have created a situation where
one party is succumbing to efforts to be
"turned." The duress code word indicates such
a situation and should be carefully chosen to
arouse no suspicion should authorities have
knowledge of its inclusion in a "trap" message.
Software Availability
The software is available as a free educational
and research download to be used for digital
forensics education and related projects. Please
feel free to use the software for your own
educational and research purposes. The
software can be acquired here:
http://199.175.52.196/OTP-Steg/.
STEGANALYSIS
RESULTS
StegExpose is a Java based steganalysis tool
heavily geared towards bulk analysis of lossless
images. It is a steganalysis tool specialized in
detecting LSB (least significant bit)
steganography in lossless images such as PNG
and BMP. It has a command line interface and
is designed to analyze images in bulk while
providing reporting capabilities and
customization which is comprehensible for non-
forensic experts. The StegExpose rating
algorithm is derived from an intelligent and
thoroughly tested combination of pre-existing
pixel-based steganalysis methods. Two new
fusion detectors, standard and fast fusion were
derived from four well-known steganalysis
methods and successfully implemented in the
tool. Standard fusion is more accurate than
any of the component detectors from which it
is derived.
The following LSB steganalysis methods
have been incorporated in StegExpose. RS
analysis (Fridrich, Goljan, & Du, 2001) detects
randomly scattered LSB embedding in
grayscale and color images by inspecting the
differences in the number of regular and
singular groups for the LSB and "shifted" LSB
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plane. Sample pair analysis (Dumitrescu, Wu,
& Wang, 2003) is based on a finite state
machine whose states are selected multisets of
sample pairs called trace multisets
(Dumitrescu, Wu, & Wang 2003). The chi-
square attack (Westfeld & Piltzmann, 2000) is
a statistical analysis of pairs of values (PoVs)
exchanged during LSB embedding. PoVs are
groups of binary values within an object's
LSBs. Primary sets (Dumitrescu, Wu, &
Memon, 2002) are based on a statistical
identity related to certain sets of pixels in an
image. The difference histogram analysis
(Zhang & Ping, 2003) is a statistical attack on
an image's histogram, measuring the
correlation between the least significant and all
other bit planes. Two new fusion detectors,
standard and fast fusion, were derived from
four well-known steganalysis methods and
successfully implemented in the tool. The
standard fusion test is more accurate than any
of the component detectors from which it is
derived.
StegExpose (the free open source download)
was run on a batch of 27 image files that were
encoded using the OTP-Steg software. Test
specifications and results are shown below.
None of the embedded files were detectable
above the preset default threshold. Standard
fusion was the test run which consists of all of
the specific steganalysis tests mentioned above.
Table 4
StegExpose Steganalysis Test Specifications.
Test Spec Description
Embedded Text File: U.S. Constitution; 52,782 Bytes Unicode (422,256 bits)
Images: 27 Various landscape PNG photos, 1200×797 pixels (956,400 pixels) Nikon D90.
Uncompressed: Approximate Bits per Pixel (bpp) 0.442 bpp
Compressed (zLib): Approximate Bits per Pixel (bpp) 0.086 bpp
Alterations: 1.445% LSBs altered, 4.335% of pixels
File Archive: http://199.175.52.196/OTP-Steg/USConstitution/
Table 5
StegExpose Steganalysis Test Results using "Standard Fusion" test.
File name Above Stego Threshold? Primary Sets Chi Square Sample Pairs RS analysis Fusion (mean)
00247.png FALSE 0.023408176 0.003533645 null 0.020185798 0.015709206
02155.png FALSE 0.068625394 0.019360332 null 0.044946323 0.044310683
02664.png FALSE NaN 5.03E-13 null 0.086586661 0.043293331
03090.png FALSE NaN 0.00370119 null 0.237370882 0.120536036
03164.png FALSE 0.136200359 0 null 0.022823646 0.053008002
03504.png FALSE NaN 0.003639508 null 0.197240313 0.10043991
03509.png FALSE 0.120022314 0.001400793 null 0.035957938 0.052460348
04031.png FALSE 0.004125309 3.57E-04 null 0.043804029 0.016095494
04095.png FALSE NaN 0.00743453 null 0.099196152 0.053315341
04164.png FALSE NaN 0.018406899 null 0.076743739 0.047575319
04378.png FALSE NaN 4.83E-04 null 0.179587058 0.090035137
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File name Above Stego Threshold? Primary Sets Chi Square Sample Pairs RS analysis Fusion (mean)
04479.png FALSE 0.047114348 0.001832157 null 0.061520437 0.036822314
04637.png FALSE NaN 3.57E-04 null 0.093757705 0.04705742
05169.png FALSE 0.030743209 3.57E-04 null 0.037141532 0.022747301
05255.png FALSE NaN 3.57E-04 null 0.112451207 0.056404175
05262.png FALSE 0.018022058 0.002062878 null 0.010998531 0.010361155
05777.png FALSE 0.017279631 6.59E-13 null 0.00706503 0.008114887
06202.png FALSE NaN 4.25E-04 null 0.093641174 0.047033017
06672.png FALSE 0.06420808 0 null 0.064583463 0.042930515
07134.png FALSE 0.03542274 3.57E-04 null 0.017337435 0.017705773
07140.png FALSE NaN 0.001423654 null 0.165817881 0.083620768
07946.png FALSE NaN 1.02E-11 null 0.072127587 0.036063794
08145.png FALSE 0.033316358 2.77E-04 null 0.023061286 0.01888482
09061.png FALSE 0.014700003 0.004850409 null 0.025382546 0.014977653
09252.png FALSE 0.074362745 7.14E-04 null 0.01319539 0.029424144
09431.png FALSE 0.040878552 0.003281354 null 0.031193448 0.025117784
09988.png FALSE 0.062680713 3.54E-04 null 0.054694774 0.039243301
Test Results Summary: Zero (0%)
steganalysis detections using the "Standard
Fusion" detection algorithm in StegExpose
software.
StegExpose can be downloaded here:
https://github.com/b3dk7/StegExpose.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented a complete
One-Time Pad encryption and steganography
system, including all software necessary to
complete practical communication. We have
compiled recommended best practices and
identified potential security levels. Finally, we
have tested the software using robust state-of-
the-art steganalysis techniques and found the
low payload threshold maintained in the
software produces a high margin of
communication security safety. No payload
files were detected (0% detections), despite
each file containing the entire content of the
U.S. Constitution as embedded text.
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